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THE CASE FOR A UNIFIED FEDERAL 
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RACHEL E. BARKOW* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
A central puzzle of any criminal enforcement and punishment regime is 
balancing the need for ease of administration and equal treatment of similar cases 
with the desire to impose proportionate punishment based on the relevant facts 
about the crime and the person or entity who commits it. The more individualized 
enforcement and punishment becomes, the harder it is to administer because that 
kind of fact-finding takes time. And as the relevant set of factors to consider 
grows, it also becomes more difficult to get uniform judgments by prosecutors 
and judges about how to weigh the facts. 
Decision-makers have different sensibilities about how to assess difficult 
backgrounds, substance abuse addiction, age at the time of offense, or any of the 
numerous other factors that might make one offender different from another. 
Some view those facts as mitigating culpability, while others see them as risk 
factors for future offending. On the other hand, an enforcement and punishment 
regime that relies on only a handful of easy-to-measure factors focused on the 
offense itself and that dictates how the factors should be treated in all cases misses 
some of the most important facts about culpability and individual differences in 
blame and the potential for change and rehabilitation. A regime focused on 
objective benchmarks with set consequences obtains only a superficial kind of 
equality because it ends up sentencing people with vastly different levels of 
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culpability to the same punishment by ignoring many of the things that matter 
most.1 
In the federal system, there is a marked difference in how this balance is 
struck depending on whether the defendant is an individual or an entity. When it 
comes to individuals, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the United States 
Sentencing Commission (the Commission) strike this balance largely in favor of 
administrability concerns and controlling the discretion of decision-makers, 
emphasizing objective factors that are easily defined and applied. While they 
have oscillated somewhat over time in terms of how strongly they have stated the 
principle, since the 1980s the emphasis has been on controlling discretion. DOJ 
charging memos in cases involving individuals have for decades instructed 
prosecutors to charge the most serious readily provable offense regardless of 
individual circumstances. Thus, prosecutors are to find the most serious code 
provisions to match the facts, thus pursuing the goal of uniformity in the direction 
of severity. To the extent there is flexibility, it is largely for those who cooperate 
with the government and offer substantial assistance to prosecutors in bringing 
cases against others. Otherwise, the working presumption is offenses should be 
assessed based on the harms they cause, and the most serious charge available 
should be pursued. 
The Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines) likewise place an emphasis on 
those factors that leave little wiggle room in how they are defined or applied to 
particular cases. In drug cases, for example, the emphasis is on the quantity and 
type of drugs involved as opposed to focusing on why someone sells drugs or their 
role in a larger drug selling enterprise. In fraud cases, as another illustration, the 
focus is on the amount of loss caused by the fraud, not the motive for the fraud 
or the mens rea the defendant had with respect to that loss. In cases involving 
multiple perpetrators of a crime, a defendant’s sentence can be increased based 
on the reasonably foreseeable actions of other people with whom the defendant 
associated to commit crime, even if the defendant never contemplated that the 
other people would engage in those actions.2 The inquiry in these multiple 
offender cases is objective and does not require an analysis of the defendant’s 
subjective intent. The Guidelines emphasize easily counted and measured facts 
as an attempt to get judges on the same page in how they sentence defendants. 
While this approach may create uniformity among judges in terms of how they 
decide cases, this does not necessarily involve equal treatment of similar cases 
because it ignores relevant facts about culpability. Defendants who knowingly 
cause harm are lumped in with those who do not even contemplate it. 
The federal government’s approach to individual criminal prosecutions 
contrasts sharply with the federal government’s treatment of corporate entities 
in criminal cases. While prosecutors and the Commission have identified some 
key factors to dictate how a company will be charged and sentenced—most 
 
 1.  See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem Is 
Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833 (1992). 
 2.  U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
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notably, whether a company has a compliance program—for the most part, both 
the DOJ and the Commission have taken a far more individualized approach to 
corporate charging and sentencing. There is a focused concern on culpability and 
proportionality. And whereas the DOJ and the Commission have largely taken 
the view that more severe sentences are to be preferred in individual cases, they 
have recognized the costs of severity in the corporate realm, emphasizing the 
collateral consequences of punishment on others and the need to pursue 
alternatives other than criminal prosecutions to achieve better outcomes in terms 
of public safety and overall benefits. 
This Article will explore the different approaches the DOJ and the 
Commission have taken to individual and corporate defendants and explain why 
aspects of the corporate model should apply to individual cases as well.3 Part II 
will describe the key attributes of the modern federal model for individuals. Its 
emphasis is on controlling the discretion of line prosecutors and judges and shows 
a marked preference for severity. Part III will explain how the approach to 
corporate criminal law enforcement emphasizes individual assessment, balancing 
the costs of punishment with its benefits, and considering other sanctions in 
making charging and sentencing decisions. Part IV will consider why corporate 
and individual cases have taken such divergent paths and explore some of the 
lessons corporate practice offers for individual cases. Part V concludes by 
advocating for the corporate charging and sentencing framework to be used as a 
model in individual cases. There is no reason to maintain a policy that sees the 
value in saving and recognizing the worth of companies, but ignores the value in 
saving and recognizing the worth of individuals. 
 
 3.  My conclusion that the federal approach to individual liability should look more like the 
approach to entity liability shares some themes in common with Darryl K. Brown’s terrific article 
comparing white-collar crime to street crime. Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the 
Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295 (2001). While Brown sees a sharp divide 
between white collar crime and street crime—perhaps because he is considering nationwide trends and 
approaches in the abstract without focusing on a particular jurisdiction—I do not see a similar cleavage 
at the federal level if one looks only at cases involving individuals. White collar crimes are punished 
harshly in the federal system. COURTNEY SEMISCH, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, WHAT DOES FEDERAL 
ECONOMIC CRIME REALLY LOOK LIKE? 2–3, fig.1 (2019) (reporting that people charged with economic 
crimes account for 10% of the federal prison population and that sentences for securities and investment 
fraud average 52 months). The Guidelines do not focus on culpability differences in white collar cases 
any more than they do in drug or violent crime cases, and the trend in all of them is away from 
individualization and toward severity. See infra Part II. Likewise, DOJ charging memos apply to white-
collar cases as all others, so the distinction does not exist there, either. Some of the themes Brown 
observes about white-collar cases in general, however, do apply at the federal level to cases involving 
corporate entities. For example, Brown notes there is a greater focus on alternatives to criminal 
enforcement and the effect on third parties and other social costs in white-collar cases, Brown, supra, at 
1312, 1333, and federal entity liability similarly focuses to a greater extent on those factors. I agree with 
Brown that these factors are just as relevant to all criminal cases, and thus should be playing a much 
larger role across the range of criminal cases, as I explain in Part V. 
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II 
CHARGING AND SENTENCING INDIVIDUALS 
Before 1987, the federal approach to prosecution and punishment was highly 
individualized and “almost entirely unregulated.”4 The federal approach 
followed an indeterminate sentencing model, where judges had wide discretion 
to choose a sentencing range with almost no oversight, and then parole officials 
had a similarly wide berth in assessing the ultimate release date for individuals 
serving sentences of incarceration.5 Rehabilitation largely motivated this 
approach, as judges and parole officers needed the flexibility both to determine 
the right sentence based on the rehabilitative needs of the particular defendant 
and to assess the defendant over time to see if he or she was ready for release. 
This approach to punishment came under attack in the 1980s from both the 
left and the right sides of the political spectrum. The right saw the approach as 
unduly lenient and insufficiently focused on public safety objectives, and the left 
saw too much disparity from the exercise of discretion by the relevant actors.6 
Both sides converged on two central ideas: rehabilitation should no longer be the 
motivating objective of sentencing, and discretion needed to be cabined.7 
In 1984, these ideas led to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act.8 As part 
of this Act, Congress created the Commission,9 and charged it with promulgating 
mandatory guidelines to limit the discretion of judges and curb unwarranted 
disparities in sentencing.10 At the same time, the Commission was told to create 
guidelines that would “maintain[] sufficient flexibility to permit individualized 
sentences when warranted.”11 Parole was abolished, and the Commission was 
required to “insure that the guidelines reflect[ed] the inappropriateness of 
imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating 
the defendant.”12 Congress also placed limits on how wide sentencing ranges 
could be in the Guidelines.13 
 
 4.  Brent E. Newton & Dawinder S. Sidhu, The History of the Original United States Sentencing 
Commission 1985–1987, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1169 (2017). 
 5.  “[M]ost federal prisoners became eligible to be paroled after they had served one-third of the 
prison sentence” and then it was up to the parole board to decide if the person had been sufficiently 
rehabilitated. Id. at 1171. Congress directed the Parole Commission to create parole guidelines in 1976, 
and in about eighty percent of the cases, the Parole Commission followed those guidelines in making 
release determinations. Id. at 1171–72. 
 6.  See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 7–8, 17–25 (1973) 
(describing variation among judges); ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
5 (1974) (describing a similar disparity among the Second Circuit); Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 
1178–81 (describing the concerns with disparities and undue leniency as key motivators for legislators 
seeking to reform federal sentencing). 
 7.  Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1183–85. 
 8.  28 U.S.C. § 991 et seq. (2018). 
 9.  Id. § 991(a). 
 10.  Id. § 991(b)(1)(B). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. § 994(k). 
 13.  Id. § 994(b)(2). 
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Although Congress vested authority in the Commission to create new 
guidelines, it did not bother waiting for the Commission’s analysis to take actions 
of its own. It passed a series of harsh mandatory minimum drug penalties driven 
by the type of drug and its quantity. It also created a harsh regime for individuals 
with previous drug offenses or violent felonies.14 
The Commission was attuned to the tough-on-crime political environment of 
the moment when it first created the Guidelines. Initially, the Commission could 
not agree on an overarching philosophy of punishment. It was starkly divided 
between a just deserts faction led by Commissioner Paul H. Robinson, which 
emphasized culpability and retribution, and a more utilitarian crime control wing 
headed by Commissioners Michael K. Block and Ilene H. Nagel.15 At the first 
meeting, one of the commissioners reported that the two sides bickered about 
their ideological differences, with “Commissioner Robinson observ[ing] that the 
Department is called ‘Department of Justice,’ not the ‘Department of 
Maximizing Social Utility,’ to which Commissioner Block responded that the 
[Sentencing Reform Act] is part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, not 
the ‘Comprehensive Justice and Fairness Act.’”16 Without an underlying 
philosophy to guide it, the Commission set out to please its tough-on-crime 
political overseers as its central goal. It addressed Congress’s concern with 
disparity by ultimately creating Guidelines that emphasized objective factors that 
would leave little room for judicial disagreement in their application or meaning. 
At the urging of the DOJ, the Commission also declined a model that would give 
judges leeway in deciding how much of an increase should follow if a particular 
fact was found by the judge.17 
To further cabin differential treatment by judges, the Commission largely 
rejected a focus on characteristics unique to the offender and instead emphasized 
characteristics of the offense as the key facts that would increase or decrease a 
sentence.18 Although mens rea was critical to criminal liability at the common law 
and in every criminal code adopted in the United States, the Guidelines do not 
focus on mens rea. Rather, the Guidelines model is one focused on the harms 
caused, with sentences increasing as greater harms are caused by the offense. 
With few exceptions, a defendant gets a longer sentence for greater harms 
whether or not the defendant had any awareness that his or her conduct risked 
causing those harms. Culpability in the traditional sense is thus not at the core of 
the Guidelines inquiry in individual cases. 
 
 14.  Rachel E. Barkow, Categorical Mistakes: The Flawed Framework of the Career Criminal Act and 
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 133 HARV. L. REV. 200, 210–14 (2019). 
 15.  Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1226. 
 16.  Id. at 1227 (citing an interview with Commissioner Nagel, on file with Newton & Sidhu). 
 17.  Id. at 1203, 1205–06. 
 18.  Id. at 1240 (“[T]he Commissioners seized on the text and legislative history of the SRA to 
emphasize the primary role of offense characteristics in sentencing determinations, in order [to] ensure 
that the balance of sentencing considerations was not tipped too heavily in favor of individualized 
offender characteristics such that sentencing disparities would arise.”). 
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Just as Congress had done with its mandatory minimum drug laws, the 
Commission made drug quantity and type central to its guideline regime. 
Moreover, the Commission built its guidelines around Congress’ mandatory 
minimum thresholds. For example, if a drug type and quantity triggered a five-
year mandatory minimum under the statutory scheme, the Commission initially 
decided that the same type and quantity should have a guideline of sixty-three to 
seventy-eight months for those in the lowest criminal history category so that it 
was above the statutory minimum of sixty months. A drug offense with a ten-year 
mandatory minimum had guideline range of one hundred and twenty to one 
hundred and fifty-one months.19 
Even under a guideline regime, there is the potential for prosecutorial 
charging decisions to create disparities in sentencing. To address this, the 
Commission adopted what is known as a “modified real offense” approach, which 
bases sentences on the offense of conviction plus other “relevant conduct” found 
by the judge. The intention behind this approach was to allow judges to even out 
sentences based on what defendants actually did as opposed to letting 
prosecutors manipulate charges to create different sentences.20 The Commission 
even went so far as to allow judges to increase sentences on the basis of conduct 
when a jury had acquitted a defendant of that same conduct as long as the judge 
found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was guilty of that 
conduct. This regime was thus all about maximizing the sentence based on 
judicial determinations, with those judicial determinations narrowly focused on 
the facts of the offense and little attention paid to facts about offenders or their 
backgrounds. 
The Guidelines had the effect of increasing sentences for federal crimes. 
Although the Commission initially set sentences for most crimes based on the 
past practices of judges, it deliberately increased sentences for white collar and 
drug offenses in the initial set of Guidelines at the urging of Congress.21 Over 
time, most of the Commission’s changes to the guidelines—largely at the 
direction of or from pressure by Congress—have been to increase sentences.22 To 
be sure, there were notable reductions for crack cocaine sentences in 2007 and 
for all drugs in 2013, and the Commission made those changes retroactive. But 
the story of the Guidelines has predominately been one of increasing the severity 
of federal sentences. Thus, the uniform application of the Guidelines means 
 
 19.  In 2014, the Commission lowered all drug guidelines by two levels. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES 
MANUAL app. C, amend. 782 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2014). As a result, the five-year mandatory 
minimum now falls within a guideline range of 51 to 63 months, and the ten-year falls within the range of 
97 to 121 months. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 20.  Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of 
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 88–89 (2003); Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1224. 
 21.  Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They 
Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1988); Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 899 (1990). 
 22.  See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 766–767 (2005) (“Of the 
hundreds of sentencing amendments proposed by the Commission, all but a handful of those 
amendments involved increases in sentences.”). 
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increased severity. When the Guidelines became advisory in 2005 with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,23 many judges around the 
country used their newfound discretion to give below-Guidelines sentences. The 
post-Booker world of advisory guidelines has thus become one of greater inter-
judge disparity, with some judges adhering to the longer Guidelines sentences 
and others viewing them as greater than necessary to achieve the goals of 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).24 
For more than four decades, the DOJ’s approach to charging and sentencing 
individuals has reflected these same trends toward severity and away from 
accounting for individualized differences in a particular defendant’s background 
or case. In 1980, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti first published The 
Principles of Federal Prosecution, which instructed federal prosecutors to bring 
the most serious charges available.25 In the wake of the publication of the first 
Guidelines Manual (the Manual), the DOJ, through Associate Attorney General 
Stephen Trott, issued a memo to all prosecutors, stating that “plea agreements 
should not be used to circumvent the Guidelines” and reiterated that they were 
to charge “the most serious offense or offenses consistent with the defendant’s 
conduct.”26 The DOJ thus committed to fostering the modified real offense 
model of the Guidelines by not allowing its prosecutors to reduce charges. 
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh issued similar instructions in a memo in 
1989, stating that “a federal prosecutor should initially charge the most serious, 
readily provable offense or offenses consistent with the defendant’s conduct” and 
warning that “charges are not to be bargained away or dropped, unless the 
prosecutor has a good faith doubt as to the government’s ability readily to prove 
a charge for legal or evidentiary reasons.”27 
The policy has softened only somewhat under Democratic Administrations. 
In 1993, Attorney General Janet Reno continued to instruct federal prosecutors 
that they ordinarily should bring the most serious, readily provable offense, but 
added that they should engage in an “individualized assessment of the extent to 
which particular charges fit the specific circumstances of the case, are consistent 
 
 23.  543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 24.  A few judges use their discretion to give above Guidelines sentences, but that happens far less 
frequently than judges who use their discretion to go below the Guidelines range. See UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING COMMISSION QUARTERLY DATA REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 11 tbl.8 (2020), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/ 
quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC-2019_Quarterly_Report_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CFD-ZUQ2] 
(showing judges gave upward departures in .5% of cases compared with non-government downward 
departures in 2.3% of cases, and upward variances in 1.9% of cases compared with non-government 
downward variances in 18% of cases). 
 25.  Vera Inst. of Just., The Sessions Memo: Back to the Past?, VERA INST. OF JUST.: THINK JUST. 
BLOG (May 25, 2017), https://www.vera.org/blog/the-sessions-memo-back-to-the-past [https://perma.cc/ 
MW87-C9LA]. 
 26.  Memorandum from Stephen S. Trott, Assoc. Att’y Gen. to All Litigating Div. Heads and All 
U.S. Att’ys (Nov. 3, 1987), reprinted in Trott Memorandum, 6 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 342, 342 (1994). 
 27.  U.S. Dep’t of Just., Plea Policy for Federal Prosecutors: Plea Bargaining Under the Sentencing 
Reform Act (Mar. 13, 1989), reprinted in Thornburgh Bluesheet, 6 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 347, 347–48 (1994). 
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with the purposes of the federal criminal code, and maximize the impact of 
federal resources on crime.”28 After Attorney General John Ashcroft eliminated 
the individualized assessment prong of Reno’s memo in 2003 and told 
prosecutors that they “must” rather than “should” bring the most serious, readily 
provable offense,29 Holder reverted back to the Reno position in 2010.30 But even 
under the Holder and Reno approaches, the presumption remained in favor of 
bringing the most serious charges available. 
Jeff Sessions once again removed the individualized assessment language in 
2017, but he acknowledged that there could be “circumstances in which good 
judgment would lead a prosecutor to conclude that a strict application” of the 
policy is not warranted.31 In those instances, the line attorney must seek approval 
from a supervisor and document the reasons for the divergence.32 
Thus for decades, and under both Republican and Democratic 
Administrations, the DOJ has sought to cabin the individual discretion of 
prosecutors by instructing them—albeit with varying degrees of flexibility—to 
bring the most serious charges available. The assumption is that it is in the 
government’s interest to seek the most serious charge it can prove, regardless of 
the effects of bringing that charge on third parties and without doing a serious 
evaluation of whether non-criminal alternatives might be better. 
The approach at the DOJ and in the Commission toward individuals has thus 
been similar: the charging and punishment practices have largely pointed in the 
direction of severity and cabining the discretion of line prosecutors and judges. 
III 
CHARGING AND SENTENCING CORPORATIONS 
In theory, the approach to corporate charging and sentencing could follow 
this same basic blueprint. Prosecutors could be required to charge the most 
serious readily provable offense, unless certain narrow exceptions apply, and the 
sentencing of corporations could hinge largely on objective factors associated 
with the offense instead of unique attributes of individual corporations. While 
 
 28.  Memorandum from Janet Reno, Att’y Gen. to Holders of U.S. Att’ys’ Manual, Title 9 (Oct. 12, 
1993), reprinted in Reno Bluesheet, 6 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 352 (1994). 
 29.  Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. to All Fed. Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), reprinted 
in Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft Setting Forth Justice Department’s Charging and 
Plea Policies, 16 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 129, 130 (2003). 
 30.  Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. to All Fed. Prosecutors (May 19, 2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/holder-memo-charging-sentencing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A92W-UXN5]. Holder released a separate memo specifically addressing drug cases, 
telling prosecutors that they should reserve bringing charges carrying mandatory minimum penalties for 
more “serious, high-level, or violent drug traffickers.” Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. 
to the U.S. Att’ys & Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Crim. Div. (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-
sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5ZX-TYA9]. 
 31.  Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y Gen. to All Fed. Prosecutors (May 10, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download [https://perma.cc/DNZ9-7MTV]. 
 32.  Id. 
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there are some similarities between corporate charging and individual charging 
practices along these lines, for the most part, the approach to charging and 
punishing corporations follows a much more individualized model that is 
designed to focus on culpability differences among entities and is more attuned 
to the costs of prosecutions and longer sentences. 
When the Commission tackled individual sentencing, it did so against a 
political backdrop of intense congressional interest in increasing severity and 
reducing disparities among individual defendants. In contrast, Congress paid 
little attention to entity liability. Corporations were rarely prosecuted in the pre-
Guidelines era and if they were convicted, they typically received relatively minor 
fines.33 Congress took virtually no interest in this regime, so the Commission thus 
had greater freedom to operate on a blank slate and think about the sentencing 
of organizations separately from the baggage attached to the regime governing 
individuals. 
The Commission separately considered organizational defendants and issued 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (Organizational 
Guidelines) in 1991.34 In many ways, the approach mirrors the one the 
Commission took in creating the Guidelines that apply to individuals. In setting 
the fine ranges for entities, the Commission sought to achieve both “just 
punishment” (a retributive end) and deterrence (a utilitarian goal).35 The 
Commission likewise sought to cabin the discretion of judges because their past 
sentencing practices in corporate cases revealed enormous variation in 
approach.36 And the resulting guidelines increased the punishment given to 
corporations, just as they had for individuals.37 
But the application of these concepts to entities resulted in differences 
compared to the approach to individuals. It is conceptually more difficult, of 
course, to identify a just desert for a company “that has ‘no soul to be damned 
and no body to be kicked.’”38 The Commission thus had to pause to consider what 
made one entity more culpable than another beyond just considering the nature 
of the crime charged. It reserved its most serious fines, which are designed to be 
“sufficiently high to divest the organization of its assets,” for companies that are 
operated primarily for criminal purposes, such as boiler rooms engaged in 
 
 33.  Robert S. Bennett, Hilary Holt LoCicero & Brooks M. Hanner, From Regulation to Prosecution 
to Cooperation: Trends in Corporate White Collar Crime Enforcement and the Evolving Role of the White 
Collar Criminal Defense Attorney, 68 BUS. LAW. 411, 414–15 (2013). 
 34.  Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: 
Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 205, 208 (1993). 
 35.  Id. at 210. 
 36.  Id. at 214–17. 
 37.  Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting 
Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697, 700, 708 (2002). 
 38.  Nagel & Swenson, supra note 34, at 218 (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul To Damn: No 
Body To Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 
386, 386 (1981)). 
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fraudulent schemes.39 Among companies operating for lawful purposes, the 
Commission assigns them a “culpability score,” which is designed to give lesser 
sentences to those companies that report to and cooperate with authorities and 
had compliance programs in place when the crimes took place, and greater 
sentences to those companies that had seemed to give tacit approval to the crime 
or where the offense involved senior management.40 
Corporations had pressed the Commission to mitigate sentences in the 
Organizational Guidelines if they had compliance programs in place, and the 
Commission agreed as long as the programs were genuine attempts at deterring 
and detecting wrongdoing.41 The presence or absence of a compliance program 
became a centerpiece of the Organizational Guidelines. The presence of a 
program could lower a company’s penalties.42 In contrast, the absence of an 
effective compliance program in a company with fifty or more employees allows 
courts to place those companies on probation with a variety of conditions.43 Other 
civil regulators have followed the Commission’s “carrot-and-stick approach to 
compliance.”44 This framework gives companies incentives to create compliance 
programs and has created a cottage-industry of compliance professionals.45 
Paradoxically, given that it is harder to conceptualize blameworthiness for an 
entity than it is for an individual person, the general approach of seeking to tie 
punishment to culpability is one that received more direct attention in the context 
of companies than in the case of individuals in the Guidelines. To be sure, the 
Guidelines identify harms caused as a ground for greater punishment in 
individual cases. But those harms are not linked to mens rea, so there may be 
instances where an individual with no idea that harm was a risk is burdened with 
an increase in his or her sentence. The focus on the characteristics of the offense 
is thus not about culpability in any meaningful sense because of the lack of a mens 
rea requirement showing the defendant had some kind of awareness that risk of 
harm was possible. Presumably, the Commission did not spend much time on the 
mens rea attached to sentencing factors because it believed culpability would be 
 
 39.  Id. at 232–33. 
 40.  Id. at 233, 235, 237. 
 41.  Id. at 236. Amendments to the Guidelines in 2004 sought to strengthen the requirements of 
compliance programs to make them more effective. Frank O. Bowman, III, Drifting Down the Dnieper 
with Prince Potemkin: Some Skeptical Reflections About the Place of Compliance Programs in Federal 
Criminal Sentencing, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 685 (2004). But as Brandon Garrett and Greg 
Mitchell note, it remains “hard to know what evidence is needed to meet” the Commission’s stated 
requirement that a compliance program be “‘reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that 
the program [was] generally effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct.’” Brandon L. Garrett 
& Gregory Mitchell, Testing Compliance, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2020, at 47, 57 (quoting 
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(2)). 
 42.  U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 43.  Id. §§ 8D1.1(a)(3), 8D1.4(b); see also Nagel & Swenson, supra note 34, at 237. 
 44.  Hui Chen & Eugene Soltes, Why Compliance Programs Fail—And How to Fix Them, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2018, at 116, 119. 
 45.  Bowman, supra note 41, at 679 (calling compliance programs, officers, and consultants “the 
children of the Guidelines”); Murphy, supra note 37, at 710 (“The organizational guidelines have been 
credited with helping to create an entirely new job description: the Ethics and Compliance Officer.”). 
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sufficiently addressed by the offense of conviction. But in the case of 
corporations, the Commission believed that would not be sufficient because 
companies are responsible for the crimes of their agents under respondeat 
superior, and thus the Commission wanted to take extra care to consider the 
company’s relationship to those crimes. The result is a guideline framework more 
sensitive to culpability in the corporate arena than the individual one. 
Another difference between individual and corporate guidelines is that the 
Commission paid close attention to the fact that companies face other sanctions 
for their criminal conduct. As one former commissioner noted in a co-authored 
article, because companies face “substantial non-criminal penalties such as 
debarment, treble civil damages, and shareholder derivative actions,” the 
Commission considered how to weigh those collateral consequences in setting its 
corporate punishments.46 Its Organizational Guidelines therefore advise courts 
“in setting the fine within the guideline fine range” to “consider any collateral 
consequences of conviction” and that such consequences “may provide a basis 
for a lower fine within the guideline fine range.”47 While individuals face a host 
of collateral consequences for their convictions, the Guidelines do not similarly 
instruct courts to take them into account in imposing punishments.48 
There are also differences in how the DOJ approaches corporations in its 
charging policies. Eric Holder’s initial charging memo encouraged prosecutors to 
“seek a plea to the most serious, readily provable offense charged,” just as they 
are instructed to do with individuals.49 But the DOJ’s practice has been far more 
nuanced when it comes to entity liability. The series of corporate charging memos 
put out by Deputy Attorneys General Holder, Thompson, McNulty, Filip, and 
Yates give prosecutors “a lengthy roadmap through a multi-factor analysis that 
the prosecutor must conduct in order to decide on the correct resolution of a 
corporate criminal case, whether it be charging, settling, or declining to 
prosecute.”50 As Sam Buell has noted, “[t]he DOJ has done this, at this level, for 
no other kind of defendant or offense.”51 
 
 46.  Nagel & Swenson, supra note 34, at 245–46. 
 47.  U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.8 cmt. n.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 48.  This is true across all offenses in the case of individuals, including those involving white-collar 
crimes where regulatory actions and civil suits might be more likely. See supra Part II. 
 49.  Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and U.S. 
Att’ys on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter The Holder 
Memo on Prosecuting Corporations], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/ 
2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF [https://perma.cc/CG9L-4C69]. 
 50.  Samuel W. Buell, Why Do Prosecutors Say Anything? The Case of Corporate Crime, 96 N.C. L. 
REV. 823, 832 (2018). DOJ has offered similar analysis on monitor selection. See, e.g., Memorandum 
from Brian Benczkowski, Assistant Att’y Gen., to All Crim. Div. Personnel on Selection of Monitors in 
Criminal Division Matters (October 11, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1100531/ 
download [https://perma.cc/T34E-TSEA] (establishing standards, policies, and procedures regarding 
determinations of whether a monitor is appropriate and to any DPA, NPA or plea agreements which 
require a monitor). 
 51.  Buell, supra note 50, at 832. 
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The host of factors prosecutors are asked to consider include the “existence 
and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance program,” though the DOJ does 
not specify any features required for effective compliance.52 In a guidance 
document explaining how the DOJ evaluates corporate compliance programs, it 
emphasizes that “the Criminal Division does not use any rigid formula to assess 
the effectiveness of corporate compliance programs” and instead “make[s] an 
individualized determination in each case.”53 Prosecutors are also supposed to 
consider any “remedial actions” taken by the company; the collateral 
consequences to others, including “shareholders, pension holders, employees, 
and others not proven personally culpable, as well as impact on the public;” and 
the adequacy of other possible remedies including civil or regulatory actions.54 
Moreover, the Manual adds, the long list of factors to consider is not exhaustive 
and no single factor should be deemed dispositive.55 Instead, DOJ prosecutors 
are told that they need to use their “thoughtful and pragmatic judgment in 
applying and balancing these factors.”56 
This model is thus a departure from the approach in individual cases where 
prosecutors are told to focus on bringing the most serious charges the evidence 
will support and are not encouraged to use their discretion to balance the variety 
of interests that might be at stake. On the contrary, the DOJ is sensitive to the 
costs of excessive charging in corporate cases and looks to see if other options are 
available to avoid those costs. In the corporate context, there is “broad 
prosecutorial discretion.”57 
That is not to say there are not parallels between individual and corporate 
cases. In both individual and entity cases, there is an emphasis on cooperation. 
Just as prosecutors are willing to give individuals enormous sentencing breaks for 
offering substantial assistance, they are also willing to reward companies that 
cooperate by helping to identify individuals responsible for criminal conduct. 
Indeed, the reward for cooperating is even greater for corporations because 
federal prosecutors would much prefer to bring charges against an individual 
than against the corporate entity because the deterrence value is greater from 
individual prosecutions.58 
It is also important to note that, although corporate charging recognizes the 
need to balance multiple factors and for individualized assessment, some factors 
 
 52.  The Holder Memo on Prosecuting Corporations, supra note 49. 
 53.  CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 1 
(2020), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download [https://perma.cc/W4L6-
DB98]. 
 54.  U.S. Dep’t. of Just., Just. Manual § 9-28.300 (2018). 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 
2087 (2016). 
 58.  Memorandum from Sally Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and U.S. Att’ys, 
on Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015); Jennifer Arlen, Corporate 
Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 144 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds., 2012). 
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have taken on added importance in the calculus. In particular, compliance 
programs have become de rigueur for companies seeking to avoid prosecution. 
While there is “neither a checklist nor a formula” as to what that compliance 
program should look like, certain features have been emphasized.59 For example, 
prosecutors look for the company’s training efforts, a mechanism for employees 
to report wrongdoing, how the company evaluates third parties with whom it 
deals, whether the people responsible for compliance have sufficient seniority 
and independence within the organization, and the disciplinary measures 
companies use for those who violate compliance policies.60 Companies, in turn, 
have sought to get a certain high percentage of its employees to finish training 
programs or create lists of those who have been terminated or denied promotions 
in response to compliance failures to show they are satisfying these concerns.61 
So in that sense, compliance programs and certain features of their design have 
become like the key objective facts in individual cases that drive punishment, 
such as loss amounts or drug quantity. But the DOJ seems more attuned to the 
limits of this approach in corporate cases. It is far more sensitive to individual 
differences among companies, even in assessing their compliance programs, and 
no one feature of a compliance program or metric is determinative. 
IV 
EXPLORING THE DIVERGENT MODELS OF CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL 
CHARGING AND SENTENCING 
It is worth considering why both the DOJ and Commission have taken such 
different approaches between individual and corporate defendants. Some 
differences are explained by the inherent nature of entity liability, including the 
consideration of some factors—such as the involvement of management or the 
existence of a compliance program—that matter uniquely to corporations 
without an individual analog. But that does not explain the emphasis in corporate 
cases on individual facts and circumstances, culpability, and the weighing of 
collateral consequences because all of those factors are—or should be—just as 
relevant to individual prosecutions. 
One reason for the divergence might be that different theories of punishment 
dominate in the two contexts. In particular, it might be that, in the corporate 
space, retribution is less of a motivating factor than in the individual space.62 To 
be sure, the public gets angry at entities and calls for them to get their just deserts, 
even if those entities are not human and therefore not objects of a theory of 
 
 59.  EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 53. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Chen & Soltes, supra note 44, at 122–23. 
 62.  Cf. Brown, supra note 3, at 1323 (arguing that whereas “[s]treet crime law maintains a relatively 
stronger emphasis on moral culpability and expressive condemnation,” “[c]orporate crime policy . . . 
takes place more in a deterrence mode”). 
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justice in the same way.63 Additionally, commentators often argue that the 
expressive and symbolic aspects of retributive justice apply in corporate cases.64 
And the Commission specifically mentioned just punishment as a motivator in 
creating its Organizational Guidelines. 
But the government seems far more motivated by utilitarian concerns than 
retributive ones when it comes to entity liability. “The DOJ has wholeheartedly 
adopted the deterrence theory of corporate criminal liability advocated by 
utilitarian theorists who defend the idea of using criminal processes against 
corporations.”65 One can see this animating the range of DOJ guidance in the 
corporate sphere, from its emphasis on cooperation and self-reporting to its focus 
on compliance programs and how they aim to detect and stop wrongdoing. Eric 
Holder’s initial corporate charging memo emphasized “the important public 
benefits that may flow from indicting a corporation” and how “an indictment 
often provides a unique opportunity for deterrence on a massive scale.”66 As Sam 
Buell has observed, “[t]he Department’s commitment to [deterrence] theory has 
only grown stronger over time,” with “federal prosecutors . . . engaged in a 
campaign to, in effect, regulate corporate legal compliance.”67 
The Commission’s focus on compliance programs is also grounded in 
utilitarian concerns. Indeed, a former commissioner conceded as much, noting 
that the organization “guidelines are geared toward deterrence” and the 
emphasis on compliance is a “means to ‘rehabilitate’ corporations that have 
engaged in criminal conduct by requiring them, as a term of probation, to institute 
and maintain effective compliance programs.”68 Rehabilitation is also a central 
theme in the DOJ’s imposition of conditions as part of non-prosecution 
agreements (NPAs) and deferred prosecution agreement (DPAs).69 
The Organizational Guidelines’ emphasis on restitution can also be seen in 
utilitarian terms. The first step in the Organizational Guidelines’ framework is to 
order restitution, which is not viewed as punishment,70 and any punitive fines 
come after that. As one former commissioner notes, the Organizational 
Guidelines focus first on restitution because “[p]unishment is . . . not the ultimate 
 
 63.  See Samuel W. Buell, Retiring Corporate Retribution, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2020, 
at 25, 26–27 (discussing how public opinion might demand the punishment of corporations, but a 
corporation “cannot be made to endure the punishment in a way that would count as retributive”). 
 64.  See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 
477 (2006) (arguing that a greater focus should be placed on punishing blameworthy entities in order to 
better exploit criminal law’s expressive capital); David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: 
Reconsidering Corporate Criminal Prosecution, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1263–64 (2016) (“The 
criminal law is our most powerful tool for expressing what conduct is outside the bounds of acceptable 
corporate behavior” and “for expressing how we expect corporations to conduct their affairs.”). 
 65.  Buell, supra note 50, at 850. 
 66.  The Holder Memo on Prosecuting Corporations, supra note 49. 
 67.  Buell, supra note 50, at 850. 
 68.  Murphy, supra note 37, at 703. 
 69.  See Garrett & Mitchell, supra note 41, at 58 & nn.47–49 (Describing how these agreeements 
seek to rehabilitate corporations through improved compliance regimes). 
 70.  U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
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purpose of the organizational guidelines.”71 Indeed, if a fine would preclude a 
company from being able to pay restitution, the fine is waived, because the 
interests of victims come first.72 In individual cases, in contrast, restitution comes 
last and punishment comes first.73 The assumption is that victims are to be 
satisfied by the punishment itself. But there is ample evidence that long sentences 
do not help victims and that many would prefer to have defendants doing other 
things besides serving time to redress the harms they have caused.74 However, 
that is just not something that seems to enter the calculus of prosecutors or the 
Commission in individual cases even though it is a primary concern in entity 
cases. 
Entity liability is thus a sphere where utilitarian goals dominate and where 
the government seems interested in striking the right balance between costs and 
benefits of criminal punishment. To be sure, the government’s approach might 
not always be the right one for maximizing benefits, and one can legitimately 
question whether criminal prosecutors are well suited to make substantive 
regulatory demands on companies.75 But federal prosecutors and policy makers 
are far more sensitive to the tradeoffs of government interference in corporate 
cases and thus work hard to ensure the benefits of their involvement outweigh 
the costs. 
One does not see that same emphasis in individual cases. One possible reason 
might be that retributive concerns play a greater role in cases involving people 
instead of entities.76 The desire to make individuals pay for their offenses and the 
harms they cause is strong: the original blueprint for the Guidelines was expressly 
grounded in a just deserts philosophy. Although the Commission ended up 
departing from it in many ways, its harm-based focus, with incremental increases 
based on offense facts, remains at the core of the Guidelines today. 
To be sure, even if a greater focus on retributive justice does account for the 
ways in which federal legislators, prosecutors, and policy makers approach 
individual versus corporate cases, that does not necessarily mean that their 
approaches in individual cases reflect sound retributive principles. On the 
 
 71.  Although restitution is emphasized as a priority, in practice, fewer than one-third of settlements 
and convictions against corporations include restitution damages. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG 
TO JAIL 126 (2004). 
 72.  Murphy, supra note 37, at 704. 
 73.  Id. at 706. 
 74.  See DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON 161 (2019) (“Many people assume—incorrectly— 
that incarceration is the “toughest” response to crime, when in fact some dignified, humane alternatives 
to prison turn out to be more difficult and more effective, perhaps in part because of what they require 
of the people who participate . . . . These programs in New York and across the country often include 
education, mental health treatment, community service, and vocational training as ways to help hold 
people accountable.”). 
 75.  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in PROSECUTORS IN THE 
BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 177, 185–97 (Anthony S. 
Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011); Miriam H. Baer, Three Conceptions of Corporate Crime (and 
One Suggestion for Reform), 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2020, at 1, 21–22. 
 76.  See Brown, supra note 3, at 1325 (“[W]hile we use deterrence rhetoric sometimes in street crime 
discussions, an expressive and retributive moralism drives policymaking.”). 
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contrary, some sentences seem disproportionate to a defendant’s fault. The lack 
of attention to mens rea in the Guidelines and the federal approach to conspiracy 
liability are just two notable examples of how the federal approach to individual 
liability fails to reflect a just deserts philosophy. There are countless others, from 
the lumping together of individuals with vastly different records for career 
criminal status to the way drug quantity and loss drive sentences instead of 
someone’s motive or role in the offense. 
More fundamentally, even if retributive justice—however poorly 
accomplished—is one of the motivating concerns in individual cases, it is not the 
exclusive one. Federal actors are also interested in utilitarian concerns when it 
comes to individual prosecutions. They often speak about deterrence and 
incapacitation as central motivators in a particular charging or sentencing policy. 
But they are not as attentive to empirical information and tradeoffs with criminal 
prosecution and sentencing when they engage in the utilitarian calculus in 
individual cases as they are in corporate cases. 
For starters, legislators, prosecutors, and policy makers are far less sensitive 
to the costs of government interference and harsh policies in the case of 
individual prosecutions. The assumption seems to be that more serious charges 
and longer sentences are always better for utilitarian goals. But that is often not 
the case. Longer sentences make it harder for individuals to reenter society when 
they are released from their periods of incarceration because the conditions of 
confinement worsen behavioral problems and long periods away from support 
networks means people struggle upon release. That is why individuals receiving 
retroactive reductions in their federal drug sentences from the Commission’s 
Guideline changes recidivated at a lower rate (43.3%) than individuals who 
served their full sentences (47.8%).77 Indeed, there is evidence that longer 
sentences can increase the risk of recidivism.78 And while incapacitation can be 
beneficial to public safety, some people would have stopped offending even 
without being incarcerated. In fact, at a certain point, most individuals will age 
out of criminal behavior.79 Sentences thus often extend beyond a point at which 
they provide any incapacitative benefit at all, yet prosecutors and policymakers 
rarely acknowledge or factor this in for individual cases. Thus they often fail to 
consider less restrictive sentences, much less alternatives to criminal 
enforcement. 
So to the extent utilitarian concerns are motivating policy in individual cases, 
the actual calculation of costs and benefits is far more deficient in that context 
 
 77.  Kim Steven Hunt & Andrew Peterson, Recidivism Among Offenders Receiving Retroactive 
Sentence Reductions: The 2007 Crack Cocaine Amendment, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 339, 340 (2014). 
 78.  See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCERATION AND THE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 39 (2016) (“Each additional sentence year leads to a 4 to 7 percentage point increase 
in recidivism after release.”); RACHEL E. BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE 
OF MASS INCARCERATION 44 (2019) (“The longer sentences people serve, the harder it is for them to 
reenter successfully into society . . . One study using data from Texas found that each additional year of 
a prison sentence caused a 4–7% increase in an individual’s recidivism rate once he or she was released.”). 
 79.  Id. at 45–46. 
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than in entity cases because policy makers seem to see only benefits to 
government interference and longer sentences and not the tradeoffs that have 
become obvious in the corporate sphere. Consider, for example, the collateral 
consequences a conviction has on others. In the corporate context, the DOJ is 
especially concerned with the effect a criminal charge will have on third parties. 
A policy of charging a corporation with any crime, much less the most serious 
one, would often mean making many corporations go out of business because in 
certain industries companies would be debarred if convicted.80 The DOJ has 
resisted this approach because of its concern with the consequences of that 
outcome for third parties, so it adopted a more nuanced approach where often 
no charges are brought at all. 
But as Sara Sun Beale has persuasively argued, individual defendants also 
face collateral consequences as a result of criminal convictions, and the effects of 
a criminal charge on third parties in individual cases can be equally devastating—
if not more so.81 “[I]nnocent parties harmed by the punishment of individual 
defendants are often less able to protect their assets than the shareholders, who 
have no liability beyond their investment in the shares of the corporation.”82 
Beale thus argues that prosecutors should evaluate these effects on a case-by-
case basis in both contexts to help them determine whether to bring charges.83 
If prosecutors were more sensitive to third-party effects in individual cases, 
they would see the enormous consequences of incarceration, “ranging from lost 
wages from the incarcerated individual to the costs of prison visits and calls, 
which can be crushing for families already living on the edge of subsistence.”84 In 
more than two-thirds of criminal cases, incarceration is so destabilizing to a 
family’s finances that it leads them to struggle to meet basic needs like food and 
housing.85 Children bear the harshest consequences of incarceration. Having an 
incarcerated parent makes them far more likely to suffer from behavioral 
problems and to struggle academically.86 This, in turn, creates a greater risk of 
criminal behavior, with the children of incarcerated parents being more likely to 
end up incarcerated themselves.87 The effects of incarceration on families should 
thus be a paramount concern in charging and sentencing individuals, and yet it is 
not central to federal policy. Shareholders fair better than children when it comes 
to considering third-party effects. 
 
 80.  Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1481, 1501–02 (2009). But see Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death 
Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797, 836 (2013) 
(“[T]he ‘corporate death penalty’ is no more than a bogeyman.”). 
 81.  Beale, supra note 80, at 1503. 
 82.  Id. at 1486. 
 83.  Id. at 1503. 
 84.  BARKOW, supra note 78, at 47. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 48. 
 87.  Id. 
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Perhaps the DOJ is more willing to consider third party collateral 
consequences in the corporate context than the individual context because the 
harm to third parties from corporate prosecutions is more easily quantified. The 
end of a company and the financial loss it brings can literally be measured in 
dollars. In contrast, while an individual prosecution can also bring about financial 
losses to the loved ones of an incarcerated family member, other aspects of third 
party loss—such as the effects of incarceration on children and their own 
prospects for future offending or negative effects on communities88—might be 
less tangible to prosecutors and thus more easily ignored. But one should not 
mistake ease of administration and measurement for accuracy. Not counting 
third party costs in the case of individual prosecutions can have a devastating 
impact—financial and otherwise. Indeed, from a public safety perspective, which 
is the paramount utilitarian concern in this case of criminal enforcement, the 
effects of prosecuting an individual may have large ripple effects on others that 
create a public safety risk. 
Federal actors also fail to focus on the many collateral consequences that the 
defendant faces in individual cases. In the context of corporate prosecutions, the 
Guidelines and DOJ policy emphasize that other consequences—such as civil 
fines or the risk of debarment—should be factors in assessing the appropriate 
criminal response, with the assumption that a criminal punishment should be 
reduced in light of other penalties being imposed. But in individual cases, there 
is a lack of attention to the ways in which a criminal conviction brings a 
devastating array of collateral consequences for the defendant. These can include 
the loss of public housing, federal welfare benefits, a driver’s license, and other 
necessary occupational licenses.89 In some cases, a conviction can mean a lifetime 
on a sex offender registry.90 But neither DOJ policy nor the Guidelines sees these 
collateral consequences as requiring mitigation through the federal government’s 
criminal response. These other consequences are viewed as additions to whatever 
punishment follows from seeking the most serious, readily provable offense. 
Again, the philosophy when it comes to individuals seems to be that the more 
onerous the consequences, the better. Indeed, one can see this in the 
government’s approach to whether a case should be brought federally as opposed 
to being left to the states. The DOJ’s U.S. Attorneys’ Manual notes that “the 
ultimate measure of the potential for effective prosecution in another jurisdiction 
is the sentence, or other consequence, that is likely to be imposed if the person is 
convicted.”91 A paramount consideration for bringing a case federally is thus a 
concern that a state punishment might not be sufficiently harsh.92 
 
 88.  Id. at 90. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 93–95. 
 91.  U.S. Dept. of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.240 (2018). 
 92.  Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 519, 574–76 (2011). 
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Perhaps the DOJ and the Commission take a different view of punishment in 
corporate cases because of a greater faith in the government’s ability to reform 
companies through other means and a more pessimistic take on what besides 
incarceration and harsh consequences can do that for individuals. The 
Commission’s Organizational Guidelines place great weight on compliance 
programs because of a view that compliance programs can make a real difference 
in the risk of reoffending. The DOJ is likewise willing to offer charging 
concessions and to use NPAs and DPAs in exchange for changes to corporate 
behavior because it seems confident in its ability to regulate company behavior 
and governance for improved outcomes.93 These requirements are often quite 
intrusive into company practices, ordering entities to shut down lines of business 
or change personnel.94 Yet there is little evidence to back up the view that 
compliance and the conditions imposed by the government in NPAs and DPAs 
are actually working to deter crime.95 Indeed, even companies are not sure 
whether the compliance programs they have in place are effective.96 If a 
company’s compliance expert is not sure what works, “there are very good 
reasons to suppose that generalist prosecutors who are not embedded in the day-
to-day operation of the subject firm” don’t know, either.97 And the DOJ itself 
admits that there is a lack of empirical basis for how it evaluates compliance.98 So 
the evidence does not back up a theory that rests on the government’s greater 
confidence in entity cases to address underlying conditions that promote 
criminality. 
 
 93.  See Barkow, supra note 75, at 185–97. For criticisms of DOJ’s ability to do this, see, for example, 
Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose 
Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE 
CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 75, at 62; Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance 
Regulation Through Non-Prosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323 (2017); Sean J. Griffith, Corporate 
Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075 (2016). 
 94.  Baer, supra note 75, at 2 (noting that these agreements “may require any number of 
commitments including the payment of fines, oversight by monitors, compliance and governance 
changes, and promises to alter or disband certain operational practices”). 
 95.  See, e.g., Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate 
Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 681 (2009). 
 96.  See generally Chen & Soltes, supra note 44 (noting that, of the 70% of companies with 
compliance programs that attempt to measure them their effectiveness, only 20% are “confident” or 
“very confident” that they are using the right metrics); Griffith, supra note 57, at 2105–06 (citing one 
study in which only fifty-two percent of compliance officers stated they were “confident” or “very 
confident” that they were using metric that “gave them a true sense of the effectiveness of the compliance 
function” and quoting one compliance officer as saying, “[w]e just don’t know if it works”). 
 97.  Griffith, supra note 57, at 2128; see also Miriam H. Baer, Organizational Liability and the 
Tension Between Corporate and Criminal Law, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (2010) (noting the government’s 
attempt at rehabilitating companies is often nothing more than “the implementation of questionable 
governance provisions”). 
 98.  See BARKOW, supra note 78, at 109; see also Tim Erblich, Measurement Matters: A Conversation 
with Ethics Advocate Hui Chen, ETHISPHERE INST. (2017), https://magazine.ethisphere.com/ 
chen_q42017/ [https://perma.cc/2QRF-GBCB] (where DOJ’s former Compliance Counsel notes 
companies should be doing better at measuring “everything” from the effectiveness of training to the 
usage of whistleblower mechanisms). 
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Perhaps instead the government sees that there are costs to pursuing criminal 
charges in entity cases that make it more willing to see what else might work even 
if it has to proceed with incomplete information. The legacy of Arthur Andersen 
looms large in the corporate arena. There was enormous political pushback after 
Andersen’s collapse, and when the DOJ has gone too far in the corporate sphere, 
powerful interests lobby against it. In contrast, there is little political fallout when 
the government is too harsh in individual cases. The pushback in individual cases 
is largely only present when there is too much leniency. The media focuses on 
those cases where someone is treated too leniently, and it sets off massive public 
resistance. But rarely does it report on cases where an individual is sentenced too 
harshly.99 Similarly, whereas those third parties harmed by corporate 
prosecutions often include shareholders and employees who are well positioned 
to lobby for change, the third parties harmed by excessive individual 
prosecutions—family members and people in disproportionately poor 
communities—often lack the resources and organization to get attention to these 
issues because they are instead focused on more basic needs to survive. 
The finances in the two areas also differ and may account for the variation. 
The government can force companies to pay for compliance, whereas the large 
mass of indigent defendants cannot finance alternatives to incarceration. This 
means the state has to make those investments, and it seems more willing to stick 
with prisons than invest in other options, even if those options are more cost-
effective, because of the politics that favor superficially tougher approaches. 
There is yet another possible difference in the two spheres. The idea of 
compliance is grounded in the notion that cultural change at companies is 
possible. Key government decision makers seem to believe this is true. But they 
seem far more skeptical that individuals can change or in the government’s ability 
to intervene through mechanisms other than incarceration to get them on a path 
to better outcomes. To be sure, we are now seeing some alternative models in 
federal courts around the country where individuals are diverted to drug or other 
treatment programs instead of being charged criminally.100 But these are the rare 
exception rather than the dominant approach, and they are reserved for the 
lowest-level offenses. In contrast, alternatives to criminal prosecution—whether 
through no involvement by criminal prosecutors at all or through the use of NPAs 
and DPAs so no charges ultimately get brought—are widely sought for entities 
and they are used even in cases of serious and widespread misconduct.101 
 
 99.  See BARKOW, supra note 78, at 105–24. 
 100.  See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE-TO-INCARCERATION COURT 
PROGRAMS (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2017/20170928_alternatives.pdf [https://perma.cc/45HG-NPGN]. DOJ policy also allows 
prosecutors to consider alternatives to prosecution, including pre-trial diversion. Dept. of Just., Just. 
Manual, § 9-27.250 (2018). 
 101.  For an excellent overview, see generally GARRETT, supra note 71. 
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V 
CONCLUSION: USING CORPORATE CHARGING AND SENTENCING AS A MODEL 
While the DOJ and the Commission may not yet see the value of applying 
their approach to corporations in cases involving individuals as well, the approach 
they take in corporate cases is, in fact, a helpful model for individual cases. As 
Judge Emmet Sullivan has noted, “people are no less prone to rehabilitation than 
corporations . . . [a]nd society is harmed at least as much by the devastating effect 
that felony convictions have on the lives of its citizens as it is by the effect of 
criminal convictions on corporations.”102 There should be more flexibility in how 
individuals are assessed instead of reflexively assuming the most serious charge 
is the appropriate one. Individual culpability should be a central inquiry, as 
should the prospect of rehabilitation. Just as in corporate cases, seeking criminal 
charges and punishment in individual cases has real costs that should be 
considered. Longer sentences can lead to recidivism and harm public safety. 
Incarceration can have devastating effects on families and third parties. 
Collateral consequences of convictions for individuals should be weighed when 
thinking about the right punishment for an individual. Taking into account these 
factors will lead to charges and sentences that are better calibrated to improve 
public safety—the ultimate utilitarian goal. 
There is no reason the approach to corporate prosecutions and sentencing 
cannot work in individual cases. The solutions here are all within the existing 
framework of DOJ and Guideline policy and just require taking the approach 
currently used for entities and seeing its virtue in individual cases as well.103 There 
just has not been the will to do so, perhaps because key federal policy makers 
have been blind to the downsides of their approach in individual cases and have 
not faced political pushback for the status quo. In contrast, wealthy and powerful 
corporate actors have lobbied hard for more careful treatment when it comes to 
pursuing entities. One cannot deny the big difference in the politics of the two 
settings. But where the federal government has been forced to confront the costs 
of criminal prosecution and the harm it can bring because of corporate lobbying 
for a closer look, it has opted for a more a nuanced framework. The key is to get 
those concerned with individuals to ask prosecutors and the Commission to learn 
from their own practices in corporate cases and see that there is a better model. 
It will likely take grassroots efforts to bring about this change. In particular, 
it would require a change in the leadership at the DOJ and the Commission to 
recognize this as a needed shift worth making. That means the president needs to 
rethink who gets appointed to critical positions at the DOJ and in spots on the 
Commission. As candidates for the presidency on the left and right have started 
 
 102.  See United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 46 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 103.  For a broader set of reforms modeled on an approach to economic crime, see Brown, supra note 
3, at 1345–57, arguing for community policing, drug treatment courts, and restorative justice models. 
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to emphasize criminal justice reform as part of their agenda,104 it may become 
more politically palatable to re-think the divergence between cases with 
corporate and individual defendants. If the goal is public safety or proportionate 




 104.  President Trump ran a Super Bowl ad touting his criminal justice reform achievements, and 
candidates for the 2020 Democratic nomination also touted criminal justice reform as part of their 
agendas. 
